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Abstract
This paper studies supermodular mechanism design in environments with finite
type spaces and interdependent valuations. In such environments, it is difficult to im-
plement social choice functions in ex-post equilibrium, hence Bayesian Nash equilibrium
becomes the appropriate equilibrium concept. The requirements for agents to play a
Bayesian equilibrium are strong, so we propose mechanisms that are robust to bounded
rationality and help guide agents towards an equilibrium. In quasi-linear environments
that allow for informational and allocative externalities we show that any mechanism
that implements a social choice function can be converted into a supermodular mecha-
nism that implements the original social choice function’s decision rule. We show that
the supermodular mechanism can be chosen in a way that minimizes the size of the
equilibrium set and provide two sets of sufficient conditions: for general decision rules
and for decision rules that satisfy a certain requirement. This is followed by conditions
for supermodular implementation with a unique equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
For the mechanism designer that wants to create contracts, taxes, or other institutions
with a certain objective in mind there is a trade off between the simplicity of the
mechanism and ensuring that all possible equilibria yield a desired outcome. Why would
agents immediately play the right equilibrium or how could they play an equilibrium of
a game they do not fully understand? The question of equilibrium play in mechanism
design combines the multiple equilibrium problem and the concern about bounded
rationality of players. While there are mechanisms that solve the first issue, there are
hardly any that address departures from full rationality.
Supermodular mechanism design is a tool that is equipped to handle both the mul-
tiple equilibrium problem and departures from full rationality. In these mechanisms,
agents’ strategies are complements, meaning that an agent wants to take a higher
strategy when others do the same. In view of Milgrom and Roberts (12), supermodular
mechanisms have extremal equilibria, and the interval in between gives the amplitude of
the multiple equilibrium problem. Using this interval, it becomes possible to minimize
the multiplicity problem, to measure it, and sometimes to solve it. This paper describes
how to build supermodular mechanisms where this interval, and so the multiplicity
problem, are minimized in an environment with finite type spaces and interdependent
valuations.
Supermodular mechanisms are robust to boundedly rational behaviors. The interval
between the extremal equilibria contains all the iteratively undominated strategy pro-
files, and all the limit points of adaptive and sophisticated learning dynamics (Milgrom
and Roberts (12) and (13)).1 These theoretical properties are corroborated by strong
experimental evidence, showing how convergence to the equilibrium is significantly bet-
ter for supermodular games (Chen and Gazzale (3), Healy (7), Chen and Plott (1) and
Chen and Tang (2)). As such, supermodular mechanisms have very desirable proper-
ties in terms of convergence and learning when agents are not at equilibrium. There
are many examples where supermodular mechanisms could be used to approach an ob-
jective through iterations: A principal designing supermodular contracts to approach
revenue maximization, a government applying a supermodular tax system to approach
the efficient public goods level, the traffic authorities setting up toll-systems (Sandholm
(14) and (15)) to minimize congestion, etc.
Supermodular games are also attractive in an implementation framework, because
their mixed strategy equilibria are locally unstable under monotone adaptive dynamics,
such as Cournot dynamics and fictitious play (Echenique and Edlin (6)). Ruling out
mixed strategy equilibria is common in implementation theory and often arbitrary; but
1Vives (16) reports a related result for learning a` la Cournot.
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it is sensible in supermodular implementation. To the contrary, many pure-strategy
equilibria are stable. In a parameterized supermodular game, all equilibria that are
increasing in the parameter are stable, such as the extremal equilibria (Echenique (5)).
In environments with finite type spaces and interdependent valuations it is diffi-
cult to implement social choice functions in ex-post equilibrium, hence Bayesian Nash
equilibrium becomes the appropriate equilibrium concept. The requirements for agents
to play a Bayesian equilibrium are strong. Thus, the good learning and convergence
properties of supermodular mechanisms are especially valuable in this context, as they
ensure robustness to bounded rationality and help guide agents towards an equilibrium.
A mechanism for which truthful revelation is ex post incentive compatible is robust
to relaxations of the assumption that agents’ information is exogenous. Agents have
incentives to try to learn about the opponents’ private information only if there are
some profiles of opponents’ types for which it is optimal to misreport one’s own type, i.e.
when truthtelling is not an ex post Nash equilibrium. While being a desirable property,
ex post incentive compatibility is rarely a feasible one. In particular, in the case of
interdependent valuations, when each agent’s valuation depends not only on his private
information but also on the private information of his opponents, truthful revelation
is ex post incentive compatible only under very restrictive assumptions (Cremer and
McLean (4)).
Most of the literature on mechanisms for which truthtelling is ex post incentive com-
patible focuses on the case of single dimensional private information (see McLean and
Postlewaite (9) for a good summary of the literature). Jehiel et al. (8) indeed show that
this assumption is necessary for truthful revelation to be an ex post equilibrium. Mul-
tidimensional private information in the context of interdependent valuations makes ex
post incentive compatibility attainable only for trivial outcome functions.Therefore, in
interdependent value environments, there is hope for truthtelling ex post equilibria only
in the case of one-dimensional private signals, which is a substantial restriction in many
settings. Since only trivial allocation rules that choose the same alternative irrespec-
tive of agents’ signals (announcements) are ex post implementable in generic mechanism
design settings with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations, Bayesian
implementation plays a very important role in these environments.
In quasi-linear environments we apply the theory of supermodular mechanism design
to the case of finite type spaces and interdependent valuations. In this setting many
social choice functions can be implemented with a supermodular mechanism without
any additional assumptions on the valuation functions. The result is established by
turning an existing mechanism into one that induces a supermodular game by adding
a function to each agent’s transfer, as proposed by Mathevet (11). We show that
the supermodular mechanism can be chosen in a way that minimizes the size of the
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equilibrium set and provide two sets of sufficient conditions: for general decision rules
and for decision rules that satisfy a certain requirement. This is followed by conditions
for supermodular implementation with a unique equilibrium.
2 Finite Supermodular Design: The Framework
Consider n agents, each endowed with quasilinear preferences over a set of alterna-
tives. The set of players will be denoted by N . An alternative is a vector (x, t) =
(x1, . . . , xn, t1, . . . , tn), where xi is an element of a compact set Xi ⊂ R and ti ∈ R for
all i ∈ N . In this environment, xi is interpreted as agent i’s allocation and ti is the
money transfer i receives. Each agent i has a finite type space Θi and information is
incomplete. There is a common prior with density φ on Θ known to the mechanism
designer. Types are assumed to be independently distributed, and φ has full support.
Each agent i’s preferences over alternatives are represented by a bounded utility func-
tion ui(x, ti, θ) = Vi(x, θ) + ti, where Vi : Xi × Θi → R is referred to as i’s valuation.
This formulation allows for allocational externalities, as Vi depends on all dimensions
of the allocation x, rather than just on xi. It also captures the case of informational
externalities (interdependent valuations) since the valuation function of agent i depends
not only on his own type θi, but also on the true types of his opponents, which are not
observed by i.
A mechanism designer wishes to implement an allocation for each realization of
types. This objective is represented by a decision rule x : Θ 7→ (xi(θ))i. To this end,
the designer sets up a transfer scheme ti : Θ → R for each i. A mechanism is denoted
by Γ = ({Θi}, (x, t)) and it describes the strategic situation into which agents are put.
Agents are asked to announce a type, and from the vector of announced types, an
allocation and a transfer accrue to each agent.2 The pair f = (x, t) is called a social
choice function. We adopt the conventional notation where θˆi is i’s announced type,
θˆ−i is the announced types of i’s opponents, and θˆ denotes the announced types of all
players. The (ex-post) utility function of player i in Γ is uΓi (θˆ, θ) = Vi(x(θˆ), !a) + ti(θˆ).
A pure strategy for agent i under incomplete information is a function θˆi : Θi → Θi
that maps true types into announced types. Strategy θˆi(·) is called a deception. Agent
i’s (ex-ante) utility function in Γ is UΓi (θˆi(.), θˆ−i(.)) = Eθ[u
Γ(θˆ(θ), θ)].
This paper is concerned with supermodular mechanisms. To define these mecha-
nisms, several definitions are in order. Given two partially ordered sets Y and Z, a
function g : Y ×Z → R such that g : (y, z) 7→ g(y, z) has increasing (decreasing) differ-
ences in (y, z) if, whenever y ≥ y′ and z ≥ z′, g(y, z)−g(y′, z) ≥ (≤)g(y, z′)−g(y′, z′); g
satisfies the single-crossing property in (y, z) if, whenever y ≥ y′ and z ≥ z′, g(y, z′) ≥
2Most of the paper is concerned with direct mechanisms.
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g(y′, z′) implies g(y, z) ≥ g(y′, z) and g(y, z′) > g(y′, z′) implies g(y, z) > g(y′, z). If g
has decreasing differences in (y, z), then variables y and z are said to be substitutes. If
g has increasing differences or satisfies the single-crossing property in (y, z), then y and
z are said to be complements.
A game is a tuple (N, {Si, ui}) where N is the finite set of players; each i ∈ N has
a strategy space Si, and a payoff function ui :
∏
i∈N Si → R. Generic element of Si are
denoted si, and s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn). Subsets of the real line are endowed
with the Euclidean topology.
Definition 1 A game G = (N, {Si, ui}) is supermodular if for all i ∈ N ,
1. Si is compact;
2. ui is bounded, and has increasing differences in (si, s−i);
3. ui is upper-semicontinuous in si for each s−i, and continuous in s−i for each si.
There are three stages at which it is relevant to formulate the game induced by
mechanism Γ: Ex-ante, interim and ex-post (complete information). Let G(θ) =
(N, {Θi, uΓi (·, θ)}) be the game induced by mechanism Γ ex-post. Let G = (N,{ΘΘii , UΓi })
be the ex-ante Bayesian game induced by Γ. Among these three formulations of the
game, the paper considers supermodularity at the ex-post level, because this is the
strongest requirement. If the ex-post game is always supermodular, then the game will
be supermodular in its ex-ante and interim formulations.
Definition 2 A social choice function f = (x, t) is (truthfully) supermodular imple-
mentable if truthtelling, i.e. θˆi(θi) = θi for all i, is a Bayesian equilibrium of G and if
G(θ) is supermodular for each θ.
For all i ∈ N let >i= (>1i , >2i ) be a pair of ordering relations such that >1i generates
a complete order on Θi and >
2
i completely orders Θ−i = ×j 6=iΘj. The product order
on Θ−i, obtained from the orders >1j , j 6= i, is denoted by >−i. Notice that complete
orders exist for all sets Θi, because types are finite.
Definition 3 An order >2i is said to be consistent with the product order >−i on Θ−i
if whenever θ′−i and θ
′′
−i are ordered under the product order >−i, they are ordered in
the same way under >2i .
Note that while >2i is completely consistent with the product order, it also orders
elements that are unordered under the product order.
Definition 4 A profile of orders (>1, >2) = (>1i , >
2
i )i∈N is consistent if for all i, >
2
i is
consistent with the product order >−i on Θ−i.
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3 Minimal Supermodular Implementation
3.1 A General Result
The starting point of the analysis is the class of supermodular implementable social
choice functions. Corollary 1 in Mathevet (2010) states that when type spaces are finite,
for any valuation functions, if the social choice function f = (x, t) is implementable,
then there exist transfers tSM such that (x, tSM) is also supermodular implementable.
Therefore, the class of supermodular implementable social choice functions is the
same as the class of implementable social choice functions. Transfers are pivotal to this
result: It is always possible to add complementarities through the transfers without
affecting the interim expected utility in equilibrium. It is also worthwhile pointing
out that if the initial social choice function satisfies ex ante or interim participation
constraints, then so does (x, tSM).
Definition 5 Define the ordering relation ID on the space of transfer functions such
that t˜ ID t if for all i ∈ N and for all θ′′i >1i θ′i and θ′′−i >−i θ′−i, t˜i(θ′′i , θ′′−i)− t˜i(θ′′i , θ′−i)−
t˜i(θ
′
i, θ
′′
−i) + t˜i(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i) ≥ ti(θ′′i , θ′′−i)− ti(θ′′i , θ′−i)− ti(θ′i, θ′′−i) + ti(θ′i, θ′−i).
Note that while the relation ID is transitive and reflexive, it is not antisymmetric.
Denote the set of ID equivalence classes of transfers by T .
The next proposition is equivalent to Proposition 2 in Mathevet (2010). It provides
the basis for the definition of minimal implementation. It shows that if a transfer func-
tion t′′ generates more complementarities than a transfer function t′, and both induce a
supermodular game, then the game induced by t′′ has a larger interval prediction than
the interval prediction of the game induced my t′. This implies that the objective of
minimizing the equilibrium set coincides with the objective of minimizing the comple-
mentarities introduced by the transfers, while maintaining the supermodularity of the
game.
For any t ∈ T and supermodular implementable social choice function f = (x, t),
let θ¯t(·) and θt(·) denote the extremal Bayesian equilibria of the game induced by the
mechanism.
Proposition 1 For any supermodular implementable social choice functions (x, t′′) and
(x, t′), if t′′ ID t′, then [θt′(·), θ¯t′(·)] ⊂ [θt′′(·), θ¯t′′(·)].
Since the equilibrium interval grows with the complementarities of the transfers, a
social choice function f = (x, t∗) will be minimally supermodular implementable if the
transfers t∗ generate the weakest possible complementarities while ensuring supermod-
ular implementation. This gives the tightest equilibrium prediction around the truthful
equilibrium.
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3.2 Minimal Implementation under a Given Order
Supermodularity is defined on the product order >−i for every i ∈ N . However, in
order to define minimal implementation, we have to define families of transfers within
T that are comparable on a more refined level than supermodular implementation on
>−i. In particular, we look at families of t ∈ T that ensure supermodularity on the
complete order >2i for every i ∈ N .
Definition 6 Let F(x,>2) be the family of transfer functions t such that t ∈ F(x,>2)
if (x, t) is supermodular implementable and (>1, >2) is consistent.
For ease of exposition we will suppress the dependence of F on x and will instead
write F(>2) in subsequent uses of the notation.
Definition 7 A social choice function f = (x, t∗) is minimally supermodular imple-
mentable over a family F(>2) if it is supermodular implementable and t ID t∗ for all
transfers t ∈ F(>2).
The following theorem establishes the minimal supermodular implementability re-
sult under a specific profile of complete orders.
Theorem 1 Assume a consistent profile of orders (>1, >2). If f = (x, t) is imple-
mentable, then there exist t∗ such that (x, t∗) is minimally supermodular implementable
over a family F(>2).
The conclusion of the theorem is quite powerful. It says that any implementable
social choice function can be minimally supermodular implemented. Notice that there
are no further restrictions on the decision rule x. There are many possible transfers that
can transform an implementable mechanism into a supermodular implementable mech-
anism for a given profile of orders. Among these, the transfers t∗ are the best possible
transfers in terms of minimizing the equilibrium set such that (x, t∗) is supermodular
implementable.
Since there are finitely many types, there are also finitely many (consistent) profiles
of orders (>1, >2). The following corollary states that there exist transfers that give
the smallest equilibrium set among the class of transfers that minimally supermodular
implement a decision rule x. Therefore, those are the transfers that give the smallest
equilibrium set over all transfers that supermodular implement a social choice function
f = (x, t).
Corollary 1 If f = (x, t) is implementable, then there exist t∗∗ and an order profile
>∗ such that (x, t∗∗) is minimally supermodular implementable under >∗ and gives the
smallest equilibrium set among all minimally supermodular implementable (x, t∗).
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3.3 Minimal Implementation with Order Reducibility
So far no restrictions have been imposed on the decision rule x of the implementable
social choice function f = (x, t), which constitutes the starting point of most of the
results in this paper. In the previous section we required that supermodularity be
satisfied over a complete order of the opponents’ type space. Finding the overall best
transfers called for the consideration of many different consistent orders and many
“smallest boxes”, so that the t that ensures the overall smallest box could be chosen.
This section looks at which decision rules can be minimally supermodular imple-
mented without imposing any particular complete order on the opponents’ type space
Θ−i, except for the usual product order. In environments with finite type spaces, all
implementable social choice functions whose decision rule satisfies a certain condition
on the are minimally supermodular implementable. This condition, which we refer to
as “order reducibility” is defined as follows.
Definition 8 A decision rule x : Θ → (xi(θ)) is order reducible if, for each i ∈ N
there are increasing functions ri : Θ−i → Ri such that Ri is completely ordered, xi(θ) =
xi(θi, ri(θ−i)), and if r′′i is the successor of r
′
i in Ri, then r
′′
i = ri(θ
′′
i ) and r
′
i = ri(θ
′
i)
where θ′′−i is a successor of θ
′
−i in Θ−i.
This condition is trivially satisfied when there are only two players. In the case of
more than two players, order reducibility requires that elements of Θ−i that are not
comparable between each other according to the product order >−i get grouped with
elements that are comparable to each other according to the product order or in a group
of their own that is consistent with the product order. This ensures that we have a
mapping between the product order >−i on Θ−i and the complete order on Ri that is
consistent with the product order. However, rather than completely ordering all the
elements of Θ−i, the complete order on Ri puts them into groups that are consistent
with the product order, but allow for more elements to be compared.
At this point we need a definition of minimal supermodular implementability that
does not rely on a complete order on Θ−i.
Definition 9 A social choice function f = (x, t∗) is minimally supermodular imple-
mentable if it is supermodular implementable and t ID t∗ for all transfers t ∈ T such
that (x, t) is supermodular implementable.
Theorem 2 Let f = (x, t) be a social choice function where x is order reducible. If
f is implementable, then there exist t∗ such that (x, t∗) is minimally supermodular
implementable.
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4 Uniqueness
In this section we provide sufficient conditions for unique supermodular implementa-
tion, which implies that truthtelling is the only possible equilibrium. This is a natural
extension of the preceding discussion on minimizing the interval prediction. In the
case of a unique equilibrium, the induced game is dominance solvable and all learning
dynamics converge to the equilibrium.
Before providing the results, some definitions and notational simplifications are in
order. Player i’s interim utility at type θi against θ−i is denoted as
ui(θˆi, θˆ−i, θi) = Eθ−i [Vi(x(θˆi, θˆ−i), θ) + ti(θˆi, θˆ−i)].
Define for any θˆ′′i >
1
i θˆ
′
i
∆ui(θˆ−i, θi) = ui(θˆ′′i , θˆ−i, θi)− ui(θˆ′i, θˆ−i, θi)
and
∆Vi(θˆ−i, θ) = Vi(x(θˆ′′i , θˆ−i, θ)− Vi(x(θˆ′i, θˆ−i, θ).
Since there are finitely many types, there are numbers Kji (θi) and γi(θ−i) such that for
all θˆ′′−i >
1 θˆ′−i
∆ui(θˆ
′′
−i, θi)−∆ui(θˆ′−i, θi) ≤ di(θˆ′′i , θˆ′i)
∑
j 6=i
Kji (θi)Eθj [dj(θˆ
′′
j , θˆ
′
j)]
and for all θ′′i >
1
i θ
′
i
∆Vi(θˆ−i, θ′′i , θ−i)−∆Vi(θˆ−i, θ′i, θ−i) ≥ γi(θ−i)di(θˆ′′i , θˆ′i)di(θ′′i , θ′i).
Denote the truthful strategy by θˆTi (·). Assume the prior is full support. Let
εi = min
{θˆi(·):θˆi(·)6=θˆTi (·)}
Eθi [di(θˆi(θi), θi)]
be an indicator of the gap between i’s types. As we get closer to the continuous case,
εi → 0. Let
Ψ(θˆi(·)) =
{
gi : Θi → Θi
∣∣gi(·) 6= θˆi(·) and θˆi(θi) >1i gi(θi) whenever θˆi(θi) 6= gi(θi)}
be the set of deceptions that are “smaller” than deception θˆi(·). Define the predecessor
of any deception θˆi(·) as the function ψθˆi ∈ Ψ(θˆi(·)) such that
Eθi [di(θˆi(θi), ψθˆi(θi))] ≤ Eθi [di(θˆi(θi), gi(θi))]
whenever gi(·) ∈ Ψ(θˆi(·)).
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Theorem 3 Let f = (x, t) be a supermodular implementable social choice function. If
for θˆ∗(·) > (or <) θˆT (·), there exist i and θi such that∑
j 6=i
Kji (θi)Eθj [dj(θ
∗
j (θj), θj)]− Eθ−i [γi(θ−i)]di(ψθˆi(θi), θi) < 0,
then θˆ∗(·) is not a Bayesian equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If (n− 1) maxj 6=iEθi [Kij(θi)] < Eθ−i [γi(θ−i)] for all player i, then there
exists δ such that for all δ < δ all Bayesian equilibria are at most δ-away from the
truthful equilibrium.
5 Conclusion (to be added)
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6 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (Following the proof to Proposition 2 in Mathevet (11)) Let
(x, t′′) and (x, t′) be any supermodular implementable social choice functions such that
t′′, t′ ∈ T and t′′ ID t′. Since we are in the case of supermodular implementation, the
induced game G has a smallest and a greatest equilibrium and a truthful equilibrium in
between them. Denote the truthtelling strategy by θTi (·), that is θTi (θi) = θi. With slight
abuse of notation, let us use θi and θ¯i to denote the constant strategies where agent i
always announces his lowest and highest type, respectively. Define G` to be the same
game as G except that the strategy spaces are restricted to [θi, θTi (·)] for each player i.
Likewise, let Gu be the game G where the strategy spaces are restricted to [θTi (·), θ¯i] for
every i. Since G is supermodular, so are the modified games G` and Gu, by definition.
As such, G` and Gu each have a smallest and a largest equilibrium. In particular, G` has
truthtelling as its largest equilibrium and the same smallest equilibrium as G. Similarly,
Gu has truthtelling as its smallest equilibrium and the same largest equilibrium as G.
Define the ex-ante expected utility function of player i as Ui(θˆ(·), t) = Eθ[Vi(x(θˆ(θ)), θ)+
ti(θˆ(θ))]. Below we show that (i) Ui(θˆ(·), t) has decreasing differences in (θˆi(·), t) in game
G`; (ii) Ui(θˆ(·), t) has increasing differences in (θˆi(·), t) in game Gu. Using Theorem
6 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) this allows us to make inference about how the
extremal equilibria in each modified game vary in response to change in the transfers
t as compared according to ID. However, since one extremal equilibrium in each
modified game is always truthtelling, this analysis will show how the other extremal
equilibrium, i.e. the untruthful one, varies with changes in t evaluated on ID.
Before proceeding with the proofs of (i) and (ii), note that all transfers ti such that
(x, t) is implementable have the same expected value Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)] up to a constant.
3
Therefore, if (x, t′′) and (x, t′) are both implementable social choice functions, it must
be that Eθ−i [t
′′
i (θˆi, θ−i)] = Eθ−i [t
′
i(θˆi, θ−i)].
Consider the game G`. Choose any deceptions θ′′i (·) > θ′i(·), both smaller than θi,
and any θˆ−i(·) such that θˆj(θj) ≤ θj for all θj and j 6= i, so that we are in G`. First, we
want to show that Ui(θˆ(·), t) has decreasing differences in (θˆi(·), t) in game G`. Since
t′′ ID t′, we have
t′′i (θ
′′
i (θi), θ−i)− t′′i (θ′′i (θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))− t′′i (θ′i(θi), θ−i) + t′′i (θ′i(θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))
− t′i(θ′′i (θi), θ−i) + t′i(θ′′i (θi), θˆ−i(θ−i)) + t′i(θ′i(θi), θ−i)− t′i(θ′i(θi), θˆ−i(θ−i)) ≥ 0. (6.1)
Taking expectations over θ−i and using that Eθ−i [t
′′
i (θˆi(θi), θ−i)] = Eθ−i [t
′
i(θˆi(θi), θ−i)]
3See Proposition 23.D.2 in (10).
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we get
Eθ−i [t
′
i(θ
′′
i (θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))]− Eθ−i [t′i(θ′i(θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))]
− Eθ−i [t′′i (θ′′i (θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))] + Eθ−i [t′′i (θ′i(θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))] ≥ 0. (6.2)
Let us define the interim utility function of player i type θi against deception θˆ−i(·) as
ui(θˆi(θi), θˆ−i(·), θi, t) = Eθ−i [Vi(x(θˆi(θi), θˆ−i(θ−i)), θ) + ti(θˆi(θi), θˆ−i(θ−i))]. (6.3)
Adding and subtracting Eθ−i [Vi(x(θ
′
i(θi), θˆ−i(θ−i)), θ)] + Eθ−i [Vi(x(θ
′′
i (θi), θˆ−i(θ−i)), θ)]
from the above inequality does not change anything and allows us to regroup terms
and arrive at
ui(θˆ
′′
i (θi), θˆ−i(·), θi, t′′)− ui(θˆ′′i (θi), θˆ−i(·), θi, t′)
− ui(θˆ′i(θi), θˆ−i(·), θi, t′′) + ui(θˆ′i(θi), θˆ−i(·), θi, t′) ≤ 0. (6.4)
Thus, the interim utility function ui(θˆi(θi), θˆ−i(·), θi, t) has decreasing differences in
(θˆi(·), t). Taking expectations over θi of the last inequality we obtain
Ui(θˆ
′′
i (·), θˆ−i(·), t′′)− Ui(θˆ′′i (·), θˆ−i(·), t′)− Ui(θˆ′i(·), θˆ−i(·), t′′) + Ui(θˆ′i(·), θˆ−i(·), t′) ≤ 0.
(6.5)
That is, Ui(θˆ(·), t) has decreasing differences in (θˆi(·), t) for all θˆ−i(·) and i. It follows
from Theorem 6 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) that the smallest equilibrium in G` is
decreasing in t. An analogous argument applies for the largest equilibrium in Gu. To
prove that we look at deceptions θ′′i (·) > θ′i(·) > θi, and any θˆ−i(·) such that θˆj(θj) ≥ θj
for all θj and j 6= i, so that we are in Gu.As a result the sign in 6.1 and, ultimately, in
6.5 is reversed, which implies that Ui(θˆ(·), t) has increasing differences in (θˆi(·), t) for
all θˆ−i(·) and i. Therefore, the greatest equilibrium in Gu is increasing in t. Q.E.D
Proof of Theorem 1 Take a consistent profile of orders (>1, >2). Under this profile
of orders,for every i ∈ N , each element θi ∈ Θi is assigned an index k according to the
complete order >1i and each element τ ∈ Θ−i is assigned an index q according to the
complete order order >2i . Suppose that f = (x, t) is implementable. Letting
δi(θˆk, τˆq) = −
k−1∑
l=1
q−1∑
z=1
min
θ∈Θ
[Vi(x(θˆl+1, τˆz+1), θ)− Vi(x(θˆl, τˆz+1), θ)
− Vi(x(θˆl+1, τˆz), θ) + Vi(x(θˆl, τˆz), θ)]. (6.6)
for all θˆk ∈ Θi and τˆq ∈ ×j 6=iΘj, we define
t∗i (θˆk, τˆq) = δi(θˆk, τˆq)− Eθ−i [δi(θˆk, θ−i)] + Eθ−i [ti(θˆk, θ−i)] (6.7)
and show that (x, t∗) is minimally supermodular implementable.
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Step 1. We show that t∗i has smaller one-step supermodularity than any ti such that
(x, t) is supermodular implementable.
Let us define the one-step supermodularity of Vi(x(·), θ) at any given announcement
(θˆk, τˆq) as
gi(k, q; θ) = Vi(x(θˆk+1, τˆq+1), θ)− Vi(x(θˆk, τˆq+1), θ)
− Vi(x(θˆk+1, τˆq), θ) + Vi(x(θˆk, τˆq), θ). (6.8)
For notational simplicity, we define
di(l, z) = min
θ∈Θ
[Vi(x(θˆl+1, τˆz+1), θ)− Vi(x(θˆl, τˆz+1), θ)
− Vi(x(θˆl+1, τˆz), θ) + Vi(x(θˆl, τˆz), θ)]
= min
θ∈Θ
gi(l, z; θ). (6.9)
Since the one-step supermodularity of t∗i is equivalent to the one-step supermodularity
of δi we have
si(k, q) = δi(θˆk+1, τˆq+1)− δi(θˆk, τˆq+1)− δi(θˆk+1, τˆq) + δi(θˆk, τˆq)
= −
k∑
l=1
q∑
z=1
di(l, z) +
k−1∑
l=1
q∑
z=1
di(l, z) +
k∑
l=1
q−1∑
z=1
di(l, z)−
k−1∑
l=1
q−1∑
z=1
di(l, z)
= −di(k, q) (6.10)
as the one-step supermodularity of t∗i (and δi).
Therefore, the one-step supermodularity of (Vi + t
∗
i ) is given by
gi(k, q; θ) + si(k, q) = Vi(x(θˆk+1, τˆq+1), θ)− Vi(x(θˆk, τˆq+1), θ)− Vi(x(θˆk+1, τˆq), θ)
+Vi(x(θˆk, τˆq), θ)−min
θ∈Θ
[Vi(x(θˆk+1, τˆq+1), θ)− Vi(x(θˆk, τˆq+1), θ)
−Vi(x(θˆk+1, τˆq), θ) + Vi(x(θˆk, τˆq), θ)] ≥ 0 (6.11)
for all θˆk, τˆq, θi, k, q, and i.
Denote the one-step supermodularity of transfer ti as sm1(ti; k, q), that is:
sm1(ti; k, q) = ti(θˆk+1, τˆq+1)− ti(θˆk, τˆq+1)− ti(θˆk+1, τˆq) + ti(θˆk, τˆq).
For all transfers t such that (x, t) is supermodular implementable, it must hold that
gi(k, q; θ) + sm1(ti; k, q) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, which is equivalent to:
sm1(ti; k, q) ≥ −min
θ∈Θ
[Vi(x(θˆk+1, τˆq+1), θ)− Vi(x(θˆk, τˆq+1), θ)
− Vi(x(θˆk+1, τˆq), θ) + Vi(x(θˆk, τˆq), θ)] = si(k, q). (6.12)
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The above shows that if (x, t) is supermodular implementable then the one-step super-
modularity of transfers t is necessarily greater than the one-step supermodularity of
transfers t∗, which establishes Step 1.
Step 2. We show that the (multiple-step) supermodularity of any function of two
variables is a sum of one-step supermodularities. Let us define the “(η, γ)-step super-
modularity” of any function ti(θˆk, τˆq) of as
SM(η,γ)(ti; k, q) = ti(θˆk+η, τˆq+γ) − ti(θˆk, τˆq+γ) − ti(θˆk+η, τˆq) + ti(θˆk, τˆq). (6.13)
Note that
ti(θˆk+η, τˆq+γ) = sm1(ti; k + η − 1, q + γ − 1) + ti(θˆk+η−1, τˆq+γ)
+ ti(θˆk+η, τˆq+γ−1)− ti(θˆk+η−1, τˆq+γ−1), (6.14)
and so it follows from (6.13) that
SM(η,γ)(ti; k, q; ) =
[
sm1(ti; k + η − 1, q + γ − 1) + ti(θˆk+η−1, τˆq+γ) + ti(θˆk+η, τˆq+γ−1)
− ti(θˆk+η−1, τˆq+γ−1)
]− ti(θˆk, τˆq+γ)− ti(θˆk+η, τˆq) + ti(θˆk, τˆq)). (6.15)
Note that
ti(θˆk+η−1, τˆq+γ) = sm1(ti; k + η − 2, q + γ − 1) + ti(θˆk+η−2, τˆq+γ)
+ ti(θˆk+η−1, τˆq+γ−1)− ti(θˆk+η−2, τˆq+γ−1), (6.16)
and therefore it follows from (6.15) that
SM(η,γ)(ti; k, q) = sm1(ti; k + η − 1, q + γ − 1)
+
[
sm1(ti; k + η − 2, g + γ − 1) + ti(θˆk+η−2, τˆq+γ) + ti(θˆk+η−1, τˆq+γ−1)− ti(θˆk+η−2, τˆq+γ−1)
]
+ ti(θˆk+η, τˆq+γ−1)− ti(θˆk+η−1, τˆq+γ−1)− ti(θˆk, τˆq+γ)− ti(θˆk+η, τˆq) + ti(θˆk, τˆq)
=
2∑
n=1
sm1(ti; k + η − n, q + γ − 1) + ti(θˆk+η−2, τˆq+γ)− ti(θˆk+η−2, τˆq+γ−1)
+ ti(θˆk+η, τˆq+γ−1)− ti(θˆk, τˆq+γ)− ti(θˆk+η, τˆq) + ti(θˆk, τˆq). (6.17)
Proceeding iteratively with this process of substitution and regrouping of terms for
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n = (1, . . . , η) we obtain
SM(η,γ)(ti; k, q) =
η∑
n=1
sm1(ti; k + η − n, q + γ − 1) + ti(θˆk, τˆq+γ)− ti(θˆk, τˆq+γ−1)
+ ti(θˆk+η, τˆq+γ−1)− ti(θˆk, τˆq+γ)− ti(θˆk+η, τˆq) + ti(θˆk, τˆq)
=
η∑
n=1
sm1(ti; k + η − n, q + γ − 1)
+ ti(θˆk+η, τˆq+γ−1)− ti(θˆk, τˆq+γ−1)− ti(θˆk+η, τˆq) + ti(θˆk, τˆq)
=
η∑
n=1
sm1(ti; k + η − n, q + γ − 1) + SM(η,γ−1)(ti; k, q). (6.18)
Iterrating on Equation (6.18) for m = 1, . . . , γ − 1 we obtain:
SM(η,γ)(k, q; θi) =
η∑
n=1
sm1(ti; k + η − n, q + γ − 1) + SM(η,γ−1)(ti; k, q)
=
η∑
n=1
sm1(ti; k + η − n, q + γ − 1) +
η∑
n=1
sm1(ti; k + η − n, q + γ − 2) + SM(η,γ−2)(ti; k, q)
=
η∑
n=1
γ−1∑
m=1
sm1(ti; k + η − n, q + γ −m) + SM(η,1)(ti; k, q). (6.19)
Now, using the fact that
SM(η,1)(k, q) = ti(θˆk+η, τˆq+1)− ti(θˆk, τˆq+1)− ti(θˆk+η, τˆq) + ti(θˆk, τˆq)
= sm1(ti; k + η − 1, q) + SM(η−1,1)(ti; k, q)
=
η∑
n=1
sm1(ti; k + η − n, q) (6.20)
and plugging this into Equation (6.19) we obtain
SM(η,γ)(ti; k, q) =
η∑
n=1
γ−1∑
m=1
sm1(ti; k + η − n, q + γ −m) +
η∑
n=1
sm1(ti; k + η − n, q)
=
η∑
n=1
γ∑
m=1
sm1(ti; k + η − n, q + γ −m)
=
k+η−1∑
l=k
q+γ−1∑
z=q
sm1(ti; l, z). (6.21)
Thus, the multiple-step supermodularity of any function of two ordered variables is
equal to the sum of one-step supermodularities, which establishes Step 2.
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Step 3. Conclusion. Note that
Eθ−i [t
∗
i (θˆk, θ−i)] = Eθ−i [δi(θˆk, θ−i)]−Eθ−i [δi(θˆk, θ−i)]+Eθ−i [ti(θˆk, θ−i)] = Eθ−i [ti(θˆk, θ−i)]
(6.22)
and therefore transfers ti and t
∗
i have the same expected value given that all other
agents report their types truthfully. That is, assuming truthful reporting, the expected
utility of an agent is the same under ti and t
∗
i . Since (x, t) is truthfully implementable,
the above discussion implies that (x, t∗) is also truthfully implementable.
Using the result eshablished in Step 2, the (η, γ)-step supermodularity of Vi(x(·), θ)
at any given announcement (θˆk, τˆq) can now be written as:
G
(η,γ)
i (k, q; θ) = Vi(x(θˆk+η, τˆq+γ), θ)− Vi(x(θˆk, τˆq+γ), θ)
− Vi(x(θˆk+η, τˆq), θ) + Vi(x(θˆk, τˆq), θ)
=
k+η−1∑
l=k
q+γ−1∑
z=q
gi(l, z; θ). (6.23)
and the (η, γ)-step supermodularity of t∗i is analogously given by
S
(η,γ)
i (k, q) = δi(θˆk+η, τˆq+γ)− δi(θˆk, τˆq+γ)− δi(θˆk+η, τˆq) + δi(θˆk, τˆq)
= −
k+η−1∑
l=1
q+γ−1∑
z=1
di(l, z) +
k−1∑
l=1
q+γ−1∑
z=1
di(l, z) +
k+η−1∑
l=1
q−1∑
z=1
di(l, z)−
k−1∑
l=1
q−1∑
z=1
di(l, z)
= −
k+η−1∑
l=k
q+γ−1∑
z=q
di(l, z). (6.24)
It is straightforward to check that G
(η,γ)
i (k, q; θ)+S
(η,γ)
i (k, q) ≥ 0 for all θˆk, τˆq, θ, k, q, η, γ
and i and, therefore, t∗ is supermodular implementable.
Moreover, Step 1 says that t∗ has the smallest one-step supermodularity among all
supermodular transfers t. Combined with Step 2, this establishes that (x, t∗) is mini-
mally supermodular implementable under the chosen order profile >= (>i)i∈N . Q.E.D
Proof of Corollary 1 In the proof of Theorem 1, we constructed transfers that min-
imally supermodular implemented the decision rule x under some order >= (>i)i∈N .
For each such order >, we can compute the distance between the largest and the small-
est equilibrium in the ex-ante induced game, using some metric. Each >i is a pair of
complete orders on finite sets, hence for each i there are finitely many >i. Since there
are finitely many agents, there exist finitely many >. As a result, there is an order >
which gives the smallest distance between extremal equilibria. Q.E.D
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Proof of Theorem 2 Define z+ to be the immediate successor of z and z− to be the
immediate predecessor of z, where z is an element of a completely ordered set. Let k
be the index assigned to each θi ∈ Θi according to the complete order >1i . Suppose
that f = (x, t) is implementable and x is order reducible. Letting
δi(θˆik, θˆ−i) = −
k−1∑
l=1
r−i (θˆ−i)∑
z=ri(θ−i)
min
θ∈Θ
[Vi(x(θˆl+1, z
+), θ)− Vi(x(θˆl, z+), θ)
− Vi(x(θˆl+1, z), θ) + Vi(x(θˆl, z), θ)] (6.25)
for all θˆik ∈ Θi and θˆ−i ∈ ×j 6=iΘj, we define
t∗i (θˆik, θˆ−i) = δi(θˆk, θˆ−i)− Eθ−i [δi(θˆk, θ−i)] + Eθ−i [ti(θˆk, θ−i)] (6.26)
and show that (x, t∗) is minimally supermodular implementable.
The intuition for the proof is the following. The transfers t∗ ensure minimal super-
modular implementation when one-steps on Θi and Ri are considered. There are steps
in Θ−i that correspond to zero, one, or multiple steps in Ri. The zero and one step cases
are minimally supermodular implemented since t∗ have the smallest possible one-step
supermodularity while still ensuring supermodularity. When a one-step in Θ−i corre-
sponds to multiple steps in Ri, there could be transfers t˜ that have a smaller multi-step
supermodularity than t∗. Suppose this is the case. By the result established in Step 2
of Theorem 1, these transfers will necessarily have a smaller one-step supermodularity
than t∗ on at least one of the intermediate steps. Thus, they will not be ensuring that
the game is supermodular and are therefore not in the class of transfers T . A more
formal proof to follow here.
Proof of Theorem 3 By way of contradiction, suppose that strategy profile θ∗(·) >
θT (·) is an equilibrium so that player i’s best-response to θ∗−i(·) is θ∗i (·). Consider player
i’s interim utility at type θi when announcing θˆi(·) against θ∗−i(·):
ui(θˆi(θi), θ
∗
−i(·), θi) = Eθ−i [Vi(x(θˆi(θi), θ∗−i(θ−i)), θ) + ti(θˆi(θi), θ∗−i(θ−i))].
Therefore, for all deceptions θˆi(·) ∈ [θTi (·), θ∗i (·)],
∆ui(θ
∗
−i(θ−i), θi) = ui(θ
∗
i (θi), θ
∗
−i(θ−i), θi)− ui(θˆi(θi), θ∗−i(θ−i), θi) ≥ 0 (6.27)
for all type θi. We will show that this condition is not satisfied if the inequality in
the theorem holds, i.e. there must be a player for which a smaller deception is strictly
better than θ∗i (·).
We know that there exist numbers {Kji (θi)} such that
Eθ−i [∆ui(θ
∗
−i(θ−i), θi)] ≤
Eθ−i [∆ui(θ−i, θi)] + di(θ
∗
i (θi), θˆi(θi))
∑
j 6=i
Kji (θi)Eθj [dj(θ
∗
j (θj), θj)]. (6.28)
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Since the social choice function (x, t) is implementable, the transfers {ti} induce truth-
ful revelation. Therefore, it must be that for all θi and i the incentive compatibility
constraint is satisfied, that is:
Eθ−i [Vi(x(θˆi(θi), θ−i), θˆi(θi), θ−i)]− Eθ−i [Vi(x(θ∗i (θi), θ−i), θˆi(θi), θ−i)] ≥
Eθ−i [ti(θ
∗
i (θi), θ−i)]− Eθ−i [ti(θˆi(θi), θ−i)]. (6.29)
This implies that
∆ui(θ−i, θi) = Eθ−i [Vi(x(θ
∗
i (θi), θ−i), θi, θ−i)]− Eθ−i [Vi(x(θˆi(θi), θ−i), θi, θ−i)]
+Eθ−i [ti(θ
∗
i (θi), θ−i)]− Eθ−i [ti(θˆi(θi), θ−i)]
≤ Eθ−i [Vi(x(θ∗i (θi), θ−i), θi, θ−i)]− Eθ−i [Vi(x(θˆi(θi), θ−i), θi, θ−i)]
+Eθ−i [Vi(x(θˆi(θi), θ−i), θˆi(θi), θ−i)]− Eθ−i [Vi(x(θ∗i (θi), θ−i), θˆi(θi), θ−i)]
= Eθ−i [∆Vi(θ−i, θi, θ−i)]− Eθ−i [∆Vi(θ−i, θˆi(θi), θ−i)]
≤ −Eθ−i [γi(θ−i)]di(θ∗i (θi), θˆi(θi))di(θˆi(θi), θi). (6.30)
It follows from (6.28) and (6.30) that
[∆ui(θ
∗
−i(θ−i), θi)]
di(θ∗i (θi), θˆi(θi))
≤
∑
j 6=i
Kji (θi)Eθj [dj(θ
∗
j (θj), θj]− Eθ−i [γi(θ−i)]di(θˆi(θi), θi). (6.31)
Recall that θˆi(·) < θ∗i (·). Therefore, the closer we are to θ∗i (θi) the further we
are from θi, and thus if the rhs of (6.31) is to be strictly negative it has to be at
θˆi(θi) = p(θ
∗
i (θi)). If this is the case, then (6.31) implies that [∆ui(θ
∗
−i(θ−i), θi)] < 0,
a contradiction with (6.27). Note that there is a profile θ∗(·) within a δ-neighborhood
of the truthful equilibrium such that p(θ∗i (·)) = θTi (·) for all i. For such profile, the
theorem is not of any use and so the smallest size of the equilibrium set predicted by
the theorem cannot be below δ. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 2 Consider any strategy profile θ∗(·) > θT (·). Choose i such
that Eθi [d(θ
∗
i (θi), θi)] ≥ Eθj [d(θ∗j (θj), θj)] for all j. If the inequality in Theorem 3 were
violated for all θi, then it would be that∑
j 6=i
Eθi [K
j
i (θi)]Eθj [dj(θ
∗
j (θj), θj)]− Eθ−i [γi(θ−i)]Eθi [di(pi(θ∗i (θi)), θi)] < 0. (6.32)
Since ∑
j 6=iEθj [dj(θ
∗
j (θj), θj)]
Eθi [di(pi(θ
∗
i (θi)), θi)]
max
j 6=i
Eθi [K
i
j(θi)] ≤ (n− 1) max
j 6=i
Eθi [K
i
j(θi)],
the assumption of the theorem implies∑
j 6=i
Eθj [dj(θ
∗
j (θj), θj)] max
j 6=i
Eθi [K
i
j(θi)] < Eθ−i [γi(θ−i)]Eθi [di(θ
∗
i (θi), θi)].
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There must be δ small enough such that for all smaller δ, pi(θ
∗
i (·)) is so close to θ∗i (·)
that ∑
j 6=i
Eθj [dj(θ
∗
j (θj), θj)] max
j 6=i
Eθi [K
i
j(θi)] < Eθ−i [γi(θ−i)]Eθi [di(pi(θ
∗
i (θi)), θi)],
thereby violating our original assumption (6.32). Q.E.D
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